Professor Graver, far from leaping to the defense of his profession actually defends the depiction by Fløgstad, even giving it current relevance by drawing parallels between the reinterpretation of German law to accomodate Nazism and the reinterpretation of American law under Bush to legitimize coercive interrogation techniques such as “waterboarding” or even hitting a detainee in the face or stomach.

He points to a dangerous tendency within his own profession not to take a moral stand, insist there are two sides to every issue and be servile to government. This may be done under the guise of a neutrality necessary for preserving the rule of law even under bad regimes, but it requires ignoring the original intent of the law, ripping the very foundation out from under the system in the process. There are good examples of the law profession participating in the defense against external enemies, but in defending the rule of law against perversion by internal enemies, the historical record is not very good.

His conclusions are rather radical, considering that they come from the dean of the oldest and most prestigious law faculty in Norway (my translation):

History gives us little reason to be optimistic. The state can be built by law in good weather, but law and order are insufficient – occasionally even dangerous – during a storm. But what should then protect us when it really counts, when we cannot trust lawyers and the rule of law? What we must then trust in is the anti-authoritarian impulse in the people, the very antithesis to the part in us that wants to bend to authorities and superior force, even the one with legality behind it.

It is in other words not law and justice that will save the rule of law when it is seriously threatened, but the will to rebel against law, and the will to insist on justice even against the system of justice. The ability to recognize when law and judgement is wrong and when the power of the court is oppressive and an assault on justice is the core of the wisdom that is needed.

Is this also a caution relevant to political science? Are political scientists as servile defendants of the system even when the system has been perverted to attack the very values it was designed to defend?

Similar charges in 1998 led to Anwar being sacked as s deputy PM, imprisoned and quarantined from politics – also being the decisive blow against his economic reform program¹. It may have been a pyrrhic victory for the sitting regime as it also served as a rallying call for the opposition eventually leading to the creation of the current opposition coalition where such diverse parties as the Islamist PAS and the socialist DAP stand reasonably united with Anwar as their leader.

In the previous round, the allegations against Anwar were by many seen as a decisive low blow by a hegemonic leader (Mahathir Mohamad) against his reform-oriented deputy who was rising too fast in public popularity . In 1998 Mahathir sat on the pinnacle of a strong pyramid of patronage and media control. He needed to prevent Anwar from getting in the position for a possible hijack of this effective machine. In destroying an internal enemy he created an external one.

Under Mahathir’s successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, that pyramid became increasingly wobbly. He was unpopular, even with the Malay majority that had strongly supported Mahathir. He was also generally seen as incompetent, and failed to exercise the autocratic control over Malaysian politics his predecessor had. Not only did an organized parliament opposition appear, gradually increasing its political power, but oppositon also grew within his party UMNO and the government coalition Barisan Nasional was creaking at the seams.

Anwar’s political quarantine ended in 2008, and in the same year an electoral landslide made Barisan Nasional lose its traditional 3/4 majority in parliament. The internal opposition became strong enough to force the retirement of Prime Minister Abdullah, to be replaced with Najib Tun Razak the son of nation builder Tun Abdul Razak and member of one of the true power dynasties of Malaysia. Where there were only feeble attempts at criminal charges against Anwar at the end of Abdullah’s reign, they have now once again managed to drag him into court where he faces the possibility of a long prison sentence and a new political quarantine. His alleged offence is engaging in homosexual activity.

Reuters comments on the strong media bias that especially influences the poorer and less educated rural Malaysia. Still, The Washington Post suggests that this whole trial may be a bad move from the government. Indeed I agree that should he be convicted, it will be yet another pyrrhic victory for the leadership of Malaysia. It was a desperate move and a bad idea in 1998 and gave Anwar the martyrdom status necessary to become the opposition icon he is. And that was in a time when Mahathir’s autocratic control of the country was much stronger than Najib’s today. It is an even worse idea now. The opposition struggles with being an alliance of very diverse groups. Further martyrdom for Anwar will certainly give them renewed strength, provided they manage to find a new leadership figure without breaking apart.

Should Anwar lose the trial, it will also cast further shadows of doubt over the Malaysian court system. In the previous round, Anwar’s sodomy conviction was actually overturned after four years. The police and prison authorities were also strongly reprimanded for mistreatment of Anwar while imprisoned. The way the trial is conducted may tell us much about whether the independence of the court system has improved or worsened since 1998.

One way or the other, the trial will have great impact on Malaysian politics. The process and its outcome will be very interesting to follow.

1. I have previously published a student paper about this in the post Sex, lies and capital controls

This might be the result of a Scandinavian (possibly harmful?) naivité about such issues, possibly brought on by a very homogenous ethnic makeup.¹ It may also be the result of a society that has been able to advance beyond a harmful focus on race. I saw an example of the opposite up close when living in Malaysia, a thoroughly race-focused country where race and religion ar important for official categorization of people. It is the story of a massive affirmative action programme that has spiralled totally out of control and become the basis for widespread discrimination in society.

I may be wrong, but my impression as an outsider is still that focus on the concept of race appears to bring more harm than good. The problem in the US is as I understand it that large groups have low income, low social mobility, language problems, high unemployment et cetera, not that the members of these groups have a different skin tone. Language holds power, and official contributions to keeping racial divisions an active part of the language may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Am I just an naively idealistic Scandinavian with an unrealistic view of the world?

1. The CIA World Factbook lists the 2007 estimate as: Norwegian 94.4% (includes Sami, about 60,000), other European 3.6%, other 2%

I quote:

[...]the candidates are God awful.  Seriously, they stink.  Just to review our choices:  Democrat Martha Coakley has a prosecutor’s complex that would make Javert seeem like a bleeding-heart liberal.  She is a God-awful politician so out of touch with  reality that she accused Red Sox hero extraordinaire Curt Schilling of being a Yankee fan (Schilling’s blog response is here).  Based on the ads I’ve seen, her campaign has also been, by far, the nastier of the two.

This leaves Republican Scott Brown, who based on this vacuous Boston Globe op-ed, is an empty shirt with no actual policy content whatsoever.  He was in favor of health care reform before he was against it.  He can’t stand the run-up in government debt, and wants to cut taxes across the board to take care of the problem — cause that makes perfect economic sense.   The one thing he is unequivocally for is waterboarding suspected terrorists.

It would be true political irony if all Obama’s blood sweat and tears over health reform should go to waste because of a mess like this. But that’s politics for you. Part of the reason why it’s so interesting…

I quote the abstract:

The rise of the blogosphere raises important questions about the elicitation and aggregation of information, and about democracy itself. Do blogs allow people to check information and correct errors? Can we understand the blogosphere as operating as a kind of marketplace for information along Hayekian terms? Or is it a vast public meeting of the kind that Jurgen Habermas describes? In this article, I argue that the blogosphere cannot be understood as a Hayekian means for gathering dispersed knowledge because it lacks any equivalent of the price system. I also argue that forces of polarization characterize the blogosphere as they do other social interactions, making it an unlikely venue for Habermasian deliberation, and perhaps leading to the creation of information cocoons. I conclude by briefly canvassing partial responses to the problem of polarization.

The argument about Hayek’s information markets is simple and easily understandable. The blogosphere has no market pricing mechanisms or anything like it, thus there is no market-like aggregation of information. I can easily accept that argument. The argument against a Habermasian public sphere is about group polarization. Conservative bloggers read conservative blogs and become more conservative as a consequence. The same is supposedly the case for other groups. Does this correspond with perceived reality? I’m not quite sure what to think. I lean clearly to the left in what I read, but I do read and cite quite a bit of right-oriented material too I think. What about you? Do bloggers get drawn to writing about blogs with the same views as themselves? Does this mean we really have a blogosphere with little real discussion? I need to think on this a little.

1. Sunstein, Cass R. (2007) “Neither Hayek nor Habermas” Public Choice 134(1-2), Springer Netherlands, pp. 87-95. Available online in fulltext through SpringerLink for those with acess: http://www.springerlink.com/content/b8167107l4662l47/

But what is the moral of the story of Obama’s theory mixing? Logical inconsistency? No, that the real world is significantly more complex than what either of those theories portrays it as, and that any government drawing on just one way of analyzing the world has a much smaller toolbox to choose from when trying to understand what’s going on and what to do about it.

Just having an American president that has relaxed the hardcore neo-Conservative thinking of the White House seems to me to be important enough for world peace to justify a Nobel Peace Prize all on its own, regardless of the greatness of his future achievements.

Put simply, deliberation is a term that is used about discussion when people engage in a rational dialogue about something in which they are dedicated to the “forceless force of the better argument”. According to Jürgen Habermas, its most famous theoretician, it should be characterized by sincerity, inclusiveness, equality, reasoned critique, reflexivity, respect and be free from the influence of money and coercive power¹ . In the more realistic conceptions of the term, we are willing to consider a discussion as more or less deliberative, realizing that a few real world discussions are likely to be perfect.

As I mentioned, I’ve been looking for methods to analyse discussion in order to determine how deliberative it really is. I’ve been trying to find a method that satisfies the criteria of:

1. Significance – Must be a method we can expect a large portion of empirically oriented political science to accept.
2. Usefulness – Must be a method that is suitable for comparative study of cases, preferably on a large scale and with a multitude of institutional arrangements.
3. Completeness – Must be a method that is theoretically consistent with established theory of deliberation, for example Habermas’ discourse ethics.

Lately I’ve been looking at two such methods: Pragma-dialectics² and the Discourse Quality Index³ . They both have their strength and weaknesses, but they share one interesting problem with validity.

In order to determine whether or not a debate is really deliberative, they both focus on the correctness of arguments presented. According to the DQI method, they evaluate the level of justification, classifying each speech act as either containing no justification (0), inferior justification (1), qualified justification (2) or sophisticated justification (3). The pragma-dialectical method does something similar when it examines entire debates for logical consistency, identifying so-called fallacies that constitute bad arguments which should not be part of  reasoned discussion.

My claim is that both these methods measure something separate from the level of deliberation, they measure the level of sophistication of the debatants. They measure how good their rhetorical and logical skills are, not their dedication to reasoned debate and fair discussion. This is not a major problem when you compare debates where you can expect people to be at a similar skill level, as when comparing two parliaments. The problem arises when you want to compare the debates in parliament to debates in other areas of society. If you compare two groups with different levels of rhetorical skill, the less sophisticated group will register as less deliberative even if they really were more dedicated to the ideals of deliberation. The core principles of deliberation dictate that the best argument should prevail no matter who presents it, but if we use rhetorical sophistication as a measurement criterion, we are already violating it by derogating the arguments of the less educated.

This is still a work in progress, but it seems likely that this specific find will play a major part in the conclusions to my thesis.

1. My rewrite of the rules presented in his book discourse ethics
2. described most elegantly in a conference paper by Nicole Curato
3. Outlined in: Steiner, Jürg, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli and Marco R. Steenbergen (2004). Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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