Some of the inspiration for my thesis comes from an article in the student newspaper in Trondheim, Under Dusken, and similar comments over the following years. Political science professor Anders Todal Jenssen insisted that the student democracy in Trondheim lacked legitimacy because of the low voter turnout and that the introduction of political parties would be the solution to this problem. Binding platforms would make student politicians accountable to the voters and increase support for democracy. As a student representative myself at the time, I was provoked. We were proud of the lack of polarization within the student democracy and, although I didn’t know the term at the time, the level of deliberation. This started me on the quest for an alternative to Professor Todal Jenssen’s strong belief in the salience of political parties.

Democracy does of course seem unthinkable without political parties. Almost every democracy is dominated by a system of organized factions that structure, educate and drive the political process forwards. The necessity for such a system is no longer seriously questioned in political science. I do not believe, however, that any institution should be beyond question. Even if we have no intention to get rid of political parties, we should strive to understand the effect they have on democracy. As I will show in this thesis, one such effect may be reducing open and free deliberation among decision-makers. This may be a cost we are willing to pay, but not a cost we should pay without knowing its size. Deliberation should not be considered merely as a normative ideal for democracy, but also a descriptive model for understanding the workings of democracy. The amount and quality of deliberation may explain political decisions and outcomes that aggregative models do not. This should make deliberation a topic of interest even if one does not accept its normative justification.

Institutions influence the way democracy works. If deliberation is an important characteristic of democracy, we should take interest in how institutional design affects deliberation. There has been some research on this, but political parties, integral to almost all modern democracies, seem to have been neglected in this respect. I will show that there are sufficient theoretical reservations about their effect on deliberation that this should be a topic of proper empirical testing. To test the relationship between political parties and deliberation empirically, we need an approach for measuring deliberation. We should have a method with a theoretically sound basis, that measures what we want it to, and that is acceptable within the wider sphere of political science (a discipline that is both theoretically and empirically oriented).

I will examine various proposals for examining the amount and quality of deliberation and consider their respective strengths and weaknesses. The Discourse Quality Index seems to be the most promising such method in use today. I have tested the utility of the method for addressing whether political parties weaken deliberation in a political system. To do this I applied the method to two democratic bodies: the student parliaments of the universities in Trondheim and Oslo, Norway. Due to a limited amount of data I did not get significant results concerning the question itself, but I have collected practical experiences and new insight into the method and its applicability.

Quickly summarized, I find in my thesis that there seems to be sufficient theoretical grounds to support the assumption that political party systems are detrimental to deliberation. A major obstacle to empirical testing of this and other theories about deliberation is found in the current state of empirical methods. Several methods have been tried, but none seem to be able to completely combine the demands needed for the conclusions to gain general acceptance. The Discourse Quality Index seems to be the most sophisticated and promising of such methods, but there are still a number of problems that should be addressed. Read the entire thesis (PDF)

I start off with posting the last rewrite of the outline of my thesis:

Thesis outline

I start out with a belief that deliberation is important to democracy and that our current systems of democracy are in several ways detrimental to good deliberation. I believe that this affects the quality and outcome of political decisions without actually empowering the people in the way supposed by much of current thought.

I do however realize that my beliefs are not very important to anyone but myself. My beliefs have no relevance to scientific debate if I cannot transform them from beliefs into complete scientific arguments. I am furthermore of the impression that current thought on deliberation, although far advanced, suffers a lack of credence in the social sciences because of weak empirical underpinnings.

This has led me to single out three research topics, each of which will be devoted a separate section of this thesis. The topics are separate and will be handled with different methodical approaches, but will hopefully constitute a meaningful totality. My main goal is to effectively argue that deliberation is important to democracy and to contribute in the search of effective ways to strengthen that idea through empirical research.

I) Why deliberation is important in representative democracy

The first research question is the simplest, but also easily the most controversial. But it is my opinion that one cannot start a theoretical debate without first asking “why?” What makes this a relevant topic of research? That is what I will try to answer in the first part of my paper.

I will not try to argue that deliberative democracy is a completely different type of democracy, one that is superior to and inconsistent with the current trend of liberal representative democracy. Quite the contrary, I will try to argue that deliberation is neither inconsistent with liberalism nor the ideals of representative democracy, but are in fact necessary parts of any working system of democracy. Following this I will not argue for the overthrow of the modern style of democracy, rather just to highlight some potential problems so that they may in the future be properly addressed, and some of the potential harmful effects remedied.

This section will mostly be a theoretical argument, drawing upon the classics of democratic thought, the major liberal thinkers and the recent day theorists concerned with deliberation.

II) How some aspects of our current institutions serve to discourage deliberation

Although I will not argue the overthrow of the current institutions of democracy, I will try to show how the current system doesn’t facilitate good deliberation, but in some instances actually discourages it. In particular I will examine the formation and power of political parties, and how we can expect these to have a particularly detrimental effect on deliberation within the political system.

This section will also to a large degree be theoretical in focus. I will however try to supplement theory with existing empirical research to the degree this is available.

III) How deliberation may be studied empirically

Studies of deliberation, despite having spawned a rather rich theoretical literature over the last few decades seem to have had a disproprtionally weak impact on the mainstream of political science. I attribute much of this to a view of deliberation as a utopian concept that has so far belonged mostly to the realm of philosophy with too little empirical research. In particular, its perceived non-quantitative nature seems to be at odds with the dominant naturalistic methodoligcal paradigm of current political science. This thesis aims to remedy some of that through exploring possibilities for empirical studies of deliberation.

Using two Norwegian student political bodies as the basis, I will apply a method developed by Jürg Steiner et al. in their book Deliberative politics in action, the most promising method yet to see extensive empirical testing. This comparative study will be used as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of this method for testing the effect of political parties on deliberation as well as its general applicability to studies of deliberation.

“Society is like a ship, and everyone must be prepared to take the helm.”
(Henrik Ibsen, An enemy of the people,my translation.)

Those of us who hold deliberation (in any form) to be an important prerequisite for informed decision making, would also be interested in the topic of how deliberative functions in society can be improved.

James Fishkin has been one of the most quoted political scientists concerned with the topic of deliberation. He’s a normative scientist, concerned with the benefits that can be reaped from encouraging more democratic debate throughout the population. He has proposed new democratic institutions, such as deliberative opinion polls, or more grandly the thought of a universal “Deliberation Day” (Ackerman & Fishkin 2003). But both of these rest on one very important assumption, that  “[...]most citizens would be glad of the opportunity to play a serious role in important historical events” (Fishkin 1991:9). And this is an assumption Fishkin seems to take lightly. But is it realistic?

John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse  have done extensive research on what processes American voters actually want. And one of their conclusions is that “People want to turn political matters over to somebody else because they do not want to be involved themselves[...]“(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002:85). In general, people want “ordinary people” to have more of a say, but they themselves don’t wish to be involved, and prefer to be left alone (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002:129). They sum this up as follows:

“The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision-making: They do not want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know the details of the decision-making process [...]This does not mean that people think no mechanism for government accountability is necessary; they just do not want the mechanism to come into play except in unusual circumstances” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002:1-2)

People are concerned that they might be taken advantage of by special interest groups and elected officials that reap personal gains at the expense of society. Subsequently they find support for more public involvement to be high when it is presented as the only option to rule by a self-centered elite. But that doesn’t mean they want to be continually involved. The ideal government is according to the common man one that governs with the best interest of society in mind, but that doesn’t require much involvement from its citizens – a non-self-serving elite (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002:130). Interestingly enough, Fishkin (1991:54-55) himself makes a similar point – that the public doesn’t seem to have a wish for participating as much as possible in democracy. He cites a survey that quite clearly shows that increases in direct majoritarian control through plebiscite actually seems to reduce the voter turnout and make the public less involved.

This is a challenge to theories of rational behaviour. Given that politics have an impact on our lives, why should we not want to decide as much as possible? One reason may be that we find our own impact on politics to be so little that it doesn’t justify our own involvement. Spending five hours in political processes won’t get us five hours’ worth of more favourable outcomes for us personally. And politicians should be very bad indeed to justify in personal gain for you to give up a major part of the life you have chosen for yourself and go into politics full time.

This basic assumption seems to be something many political theorists forget to take into account. Most people are happy leaving decisions to a system they trust. And I believe the kind of systems Fishkin suggest presupposes a high level of trust that your opinions will be taken seriously.  If this is true, what we have to start looking at is how to improve trust in politicians and how to improve the deliberative processes inside the governments we already have.

Sources

Ackerman, Bruce, & James S. Fishkin (2003) “Deliberation Day”. In James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett (Eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy. Malden: Blackwell, 7-31

Fishkin, James S. (1991) Democracy and Deliberation. New Directions for Democratic Reform, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hibbing, John R., & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002) Stealth democracy: Americans’ beliefs about how government should work, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

I’m of course talking about the amendment to the Californian constitution to ban gay marriage, which was voted for together with the presidential election. For those who might not be familiar with the American political system, this is quite common – to include propositions to be voted on by the public together with any election. The infamous Proposition 8, named after its number on the ballot, got 52.1 percent of the vote, more than the necessary simple majority for a new state constitution amendment. It reads as follows:

SEC. 7.5. Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.

As a strong supporter of gay rights, this has ruined some of my new found belief in America. But aside from my personal feelings, this is the kind of thing that would make influential political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville turn in his grave.

A French aristocrat and scholar, he travelled the young USA studying their democracy with great admiration. In 1835 he published his most famous book, Democracy in America where he analyzed the political culture of this nation that according to him was the greatest example in his time of what government should be in the future.

Even as a liberal in 1835, I doubt Tocqueville was in favour of gay marriage. Why do I then claim that he would turn in his grave now? Because his greatest warning about democracy was what he called “the tyranny of the majority”, or the possibility of any small majority trampling the rights of a minority. For example a predominantly heterosexual majority of only 52.1 percent of voters removing a fundamental right for a homosexual minority. Not only refusing to allow new gay marriages, but even removing recognition of previously approved ones.

How could this happen? First of all, the American political systems allows new laws to be passed by plebiscite without approval of representative bodies. This is in itself rather uncommon in modern democracies. Secondly, the Californian constitution allows amendment by simple majority rather than the rather common 2/3 supermajority. Any faction of voters totalling more than 50% can decide almost anything they want.

An interesting fact is that Obama’s great success seems to have affected the result in favour of the proposition. As reported by LA Times, there was great support for it in the black population, and Obama’s campaign made black people vote like never before.

Before I get side tracked too far, I’ll rein myself back in by concluding that although Tocqueville might not be too much in favour of gay rights, I’m sure he would – like me – be greatly concerned about this blatant display of tyranny by a pretty slim majority.

UPDATE: Some more posts on the topic of California’s Proposition 8

• The beat in my head: “My thoughts on Prop 8” – some interesting thoughts on whether gay marriage really creates any victims, and a scary piece of propaganda
• Trust, but verify: “Will California uphold the will of the people” – about the legal struggle for overturning the decision in court
• The reformed pastor: “Californinans to vote on Gay Marriage” – a word from the other side, considering the measures to prevent the voting on Proposition 8 “antidemocratic”
• Good as you: “FRC: Why aren’t you being antidemocratic, court basher Arnold?” – a word from the proposition 8 supporters and a counterargument.
• The kitchen table: “Black folks and the passage of prop 8” – a comment by Dr. Melissa Harris-Lacewell of Princeton University.

His answer to these problems:

Vi trenger en annen politisk kultur enn den mediene og mange andre har forsøkt å oppdra oss til i sommer. Vi trenger en styringsdyktig politisk kultur i stedet for en galluppreget politisk elite. Vi trenger politikere som også er i stand til å se inn i fremtiden og føre an. Hvis ikke kan en stadig økende kravmentalitet ødelegge for oss alle.

My translation:

We need a different political culture than the one the media and many others have tried to educate us about this summer. We need a political culture for leadership rather than a political elite dominated by opinion polls. We need politicians that are able to look into the future and take the lead. If not, an ever increasing mentality of demands will ruin things for us all.

This isn’t a particularly novel point. Edmund Burke warned his constituency in Bristol about leaders who were nothing but slaves to public opinion all the way back in 1774. And in 1784, James Madison stated that:

Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

It may be an old issue, but it’s an important one, and one that has become very visible in Norway over the last months. A series of cabinet ministers have come and gone – not because of their policies but because of media campaigns where they have been tricked into making blunders. Over the last few years, we have also seen the populist radical right grow bolder and more confident, gradually boosting the close combat fight over next week’s opinion polls.

The usual explanation is some sort of meaningless catchphrase about how media has transformed politics. It’s far too simple to blame it all on the media. It’s been going on since 1774, and most likely before. Media may have been a catalyst, though. Surely the pressure on Burke who had to correspond with his constituents by Royal Mail must have been a lot easier than the pressure on Thorbjørn Jagland who has TV reporters ready to have his response in the voters’ living rooms in a couple of seconds.

So what can be done about it? If media is the catalyst (or according to some the main reason), can we somehow reform them and make them put a more responsible focus on the long term? At first thought this might make some people nod. But what if I refer to ‘media’ by the term usually used in democracy theory: ‘the free press’. Making the press behave more responsibly sounds like what every dictatorship claims it’s doing. And it’s the same point Madison makes in the same 1784 article:

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence… …It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

When we’re building democracies, we praise them under the name ‘the free press’, when our democracies are in trouble we berate them under a different name. The media themselves, on the other hand, defend themselves as being mere reflections of society. I believe we have to look for a more substantial explanation than merely blaming them for democracy’s ailments. Curbing media’s freedom to write what they want when they want will be more dangerous than the problem we’re trying to cure.

So we’re back to Jagland’s call for a “new political culture”. What does that really mean?

Let’s look at what the problem really is. As Burke said it, it will always be difficult to prioritize long term concerns over the immediate. The challenges of the present are apparent, the challenges of the future are uncertain at best. In mature democracies, the practical difference between the major political parties are rather minor and complex in nature. Those minor differences are much more easy to see in the well known short term than in the little known long term. Thus it’s a lot easier to prove you’re better than your opponent when you can show immediate results. If you focus on the long term and your opponent delievers results now, then he’s sure to beat you at the upcoming election, and your brilliant long term plan wil be of little consequence.

Political Economists call it a ‘chicken race’ or a ‘hawk-dove game’. If both keep going, they’ll crash. In our case the future for either politician will be wildly unpredictible, and politicians in general will lose influence as voters grow frustrated by the lack of clear direction. The politician who backs down first will, however lose right away to the one that keeps going. If both turn away, in our case abandons short-sightedness, the future is less certain for either, but society is sure to gain some sort of consistent long term strategy. Society would be best off if both backed down, but politicians are at a so-called Nash equilibirum: Unless they can influence the behavior of the other it will be in their interest to continue.

So the only one who can find a way out is a politician who can, by his own actions, change the behavior of his opponents. The kind of great political leader that by force of his own personality can stake out a long term course and shrug off short term attacks. The kind of leader with a so strong vision of the future that whoever wants to compete with him (or her) must compete with that vision, not trying to trip (or Tripp?) him and push him aside over issues that’ll be minor and inconsequential in the long term. We certainly won’t find him among Norwegian politicians who for example fall from grace over issues of violating the rules for renting out a farm outhouse, or Americans who keep being dismissed for their personal indiscretions. Neither will we find him among leaders who manage to stay in power by trampling freedom of speech and other liberties.

Some say that the time of great leaders is gone. I sincerely hope they’re wrong….